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Abstract 
Phishing attacks are a common feature of online communications. Phishing attacks impact many actors, from individual victims 
to the corporate and government agencies whose brands are deceptively used. Responding to phishing is big business, driving 
software security markets, influencing eCommerce uptake and participation, and protecting corporate brand and image. Yet 
despite its insidious nature and the penetration of phishing throughout online communications, little is known regarding phishing 
attacks and their responses. This paper is a response to this key knowledge gap, analyzing the tasks and mapping the social 
interactions of a phishing attack and the associated response. To achieve this, the research team adopted a multi-method approach 
in examining the underlying functions and interactions involved in a phishing attack and its response by deliberately ‘taking the 
phishing bait’, interviewing a sample of individuals that had unwittingly responded to phishing attacks, and engaging with 
organisations that took response measures to such events. This multi-actor engagement provided critical observations and content 
about the victim experience and interactions with those responsible for the attacks. The research is highly novel in its application 
of Work Domain Analysis (WDA) to gain an understanding of the functional structure of phishing attacks and the online 
transactional environment they target as a sociotechnical system. By examining the functional properties of interactions within 
the research context, the paper provides a unique perspective of phishing and the inter-linkages and dependencies across multiple 
levels of abstraction from the initial ‘baiting’ to the achievement of overall system objectives by cybercriminals. The findings 
provide opportunities to enhance phishing prevention and detection methodologies, improve individual resilience to such attacks, 
and pave the way for future efforts in applying sociotechnical systems methods to the cybercrime environment. 
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1. Introduction 
Phishing as a means to illegally compromise personal information and facilitate its misuse continues to grow in 
prevalence and sophistication. In 2014 there were more than 120,000 unique phishing attacks worldwide that 
purported to represent a specific brand or entity, culminating in billions of email transmissions [1]. For the month of 
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January 2015, PhishTank, a public anti-phishing reporting service operated by OpenDNS, received in excess of 
35,000 validated phishing domains [2]. Symantec estimates that one in every 392 emails communicated worldwide 
during 2013 were phishing emails, with login credentials for online accounts the primary information target [3]. 
Whilst there may be financial incentives to overstate or dramatize the threat by some within the information security 
industry, there is little doubt that phishing continues to present an enduring threat to consumers, firms and 
government from when it was first identified as a threat to online communications over twenty years ago [4].  
In its basic form, phishing combines social engineering and complex attack vectors to create an illusion or 
deception in the eyes of the email recipient that the legitimacy of what is being offered or asked is not only truthful, 
but persuasive enough to prompt an action by the recipient in some form. The action may vary, and is almost entirely 
directed at acquiring or gaining access to personal information. It is this very engagement that is critical for a 
phishing event to lead to the compromise of personal information and credentials, most typically payment 
information [3]. Thus the phishing environment is a complex system, one that involves multiple actors, dependent on 
human computer interaction to either attain or protect the information sought after.  
It is also an environment where variants of the phishing methodology draw in legitimate organizations, those that 
have their brand associated with phishing email content. Not all phishing involves the impersonation of brands. 
Some phishing emails may simply focus on inheritance offers or lottery winnings. Others, however, direct the bait 
towards customers of legitimate brands, for example taxation or revenue departments, postal services, online 
payment system providers and financial institutions. The legitimate brand owner may have no knowledge that their 
brand is being used to facilitate deceptive conduct. Knowledge transfer between a detecting party and the legitimate 
corporate or government brand owner may be latent, and for potentially successful criminal endeavors, non-existent.  
It is clear then that the system underpinning phishing and phishing responses is a complex sociotechnical system. 
In addition, there appears to be only sparse literature that attempts to describe this system, how human and technical 
elements interact, and what factors influence the likelihood of success of attempts to mitigate phishing attacks. This 
paper is a direct response to this, describing the initial phase of a program of research in which the authors are 
applying sociotechnical systems theory and methods to understand and mitigate phishing attacks. The case study 
described in this paper examines the specific actions of the ‘phisher’, the criminals that conduct the phishing attacks, 
and the brand owners or ‘responders’, the entities the victims believe they are genuinely engaging with that opt for a 
response to such events. Specifically, the first phase of Cognitive Work Analysis [5], Work Domain Analysis 
(WDA) is used to examine the systemic and multi-agent nature of phishing attacks and response environments 
involving corporate and government brands as the ‘bait’ lend themselves to exploring the functional structure of the 
work domain of interest. Exploring the purposes, functions, physical processes and objects at different levels of 
decomposition facilities a highly unique view of the phishing attack and response problem. WDA provides as a 
means to examine the interconnected functions across multiple levels of abstraction [5]. In doing so, the research 
explores the overarching functions of the criminal and the responding entity within the phishing environment. This 
novel approach in overlaying the phisher and responder work domains highlights opportunities to explore in detail 
the critical vectors in common, and ultimately, focal points to enhance early detection and effective response to 
phishing attacks. 
2. Phishing attack and response literature 
The origins of phishing can be traced back to 1986 where a first year Cambridge University student wrote a 
program called ‘FISHES’ that recorded usernames and passwords by unsuspecting users when they responded to 
seemingly legitimate university authentication protocols [4]. However it wasn’t until ten years after this event that 
hackers in the United States responsible for obtaining America On-Line (AOL) usernames and passwords were 
described as committing phishing by the alt.hacker newsgroup in January 1996 [6]. Perhaps as an extension of the 
initial United Kingdom ‘FISHES’ experience, the American adaptation of using “ph” in lieu of “f” in describing the 
new threat perhaps has its influence with the preferred use of “ph” in North America to described other technology 
enabled threats, such as phreaking [7].  
Research on phishing has almost exclusively been the domain of the information systems, sociology and 
criminology disciplines. Focus has centered upon the specific merits of detection and prevention tools [12], the 
impacts of phishing and individual victimization [13], and individual susceptibility to these attacks [14]. There has 
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been a variety of emphasis on the individual actor within the phishing attack and response scenario, from the 
effectiveness of organizational email filtering controls, through to the likelihood of victimization through testing the 
behavioral responses to come from varying phishing-type stimuli. The latter body of research has tended to migrate 
and extend what has been a substantial foray into online trust and engagement. This literature offers some interesting 
perspectives on what functions may be required of the phisher to make their attack successful, and conversely, what 
representations and knowledge transfer about the ‘real’ website is needed from the responder to educate customers 
on how to avoided falling victim to a phishing attack. Phishers use what Koehn [16] describes as differing forms of 
trust that have applicability to the phishing context. The first form of trust conceptualization is goal-based trust, that 
is trust arising where individuals share a common purpose, such as funds transferred from the phishing email 
recipient to an alleged hospital or medical practitioner for the purposes of assisting with the recovery of another 
person. The second form of trust constructed by Koehn is calculative trust where a party gains trust of another where 
they have made a calculated decision on the costs and benefits, typically influenced by familiarity and reputation. 
Within a phishing context this often motivates the criminal to use legitimate brands to create familiarity and an 
expectation based on a customer’s prior engagement that product or service delivery will occur based on the 
customer’s actions. The third form of trust that has applicability to a phishing context that helps to understand its 
many variations is knowledge-based trust. Perhaps seen as an extension of calculative trust, knowledge-based trust 
occurs in environments where there is a deeper existing relationship between parties and is used in phishing attacks 
where a high degree of social engineering has been invested in by the phisher to understand existing knowledge and 
trust networks of their target audience (for example, purporting to be a distant family member). Trust is fundamental 
to the success of preventing or achieving the phishing outcome. 
A key gap in the literature are studies examining phishing through a systems thinking lens. This is an important 
gap. Not only does this indicate that our understanding of phishing may be limited, it also suggests that the 
development of countermeasures and response systems may be ill-informed. In human factors, whereby systems 
thinking is currently a highly popular research approach, it is widely acknowledged that reductionism, whereby 
systems are reduced to their parts in order to understand them, is an inappropriate approach for understanding 
improving a systems behavior. Moreover, attempting to enhance system performance through ‘fixing broken 
components’ is known to be a flawed approach [20]. This paper contends that a systems thinking approach based on 
human factors theory and methods is an important requirement for phishing system research. 
Within human factors and ergonomics the attention on phishing, and cybercrime more broadly, is scant. Carpenter 
et al.’s (2007) experimental research findings on improving prevention of unwitting information disclosures online 
through the use of written warnings goes some way to examining the user or individual perspective [14]. Whilst not 
directly attributed to the phishing context, their research has applicability for the responding agent, the legitimate 
brand owner, in shaping online content for prevention purposes. However the research was restrictive in its 
definition of phishing and the methods by which personal information can be acquired. Unlike Carpenter et al’s 
definition of phishing that restricts acts to those involving an email that directs an individual to a website whereupon 
they provide information, the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) reveals a richer technical subterfuge at play 
during phishing events. The APWG define phishing as being inclusive of acts whereupon the phisher plants 
computer viruses and programs on an individual’s Internet enabled device to steal credentials directly, including the 
interception of user names and passwords, and in a growing number of instances, keystroke loggers that intercept 
consumer keyboard inputs. For example, in the third quarter of 2014, APWG revealed that on average 227,000 new 
malicious files were discovered each day relating to phishing emails [15].  
Fig. 1. Simplistic model of a phishing attack. 
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Like its adaptations in name, phishing by its very nature continues to evolve dramatically, with new emergent 
behaviors arising as systems are modified. What was once a simple means by which an email communication was 
sent, purporting to be from a legitimate and reputable brand, that coaxed recipients to act in a way that enabled the 
criminal to acquire personal information and credentials, now features significant diversity in technical 
sophistication. Phishing emails may now facilitate in the execution of malware that serves a similar purpose to 
having the phisher collect personal information and credentials via more traditional means. In other instances, the 
phisher may telephone contact with the email recipient in order to facilitate the remote access of their computer to 
harvest personal information. The initial email and the trust features contained within has tended to remain  
relatively unchanged, what’s evolving are the vectors associated with harvesting the personal information. With the 
assistance of subject matter experts within a national identity theft support service that respond to phishing attacks, 
both to the individuals and the firms and government agencies that have had their brands used to deceive, the 
research team were able to map diagrammatically at Figure 1 their representation of a simple phishing attack model. 
The ‘bait’ in the simplistic model of a phishing attack involving legitimate brands relates to the creation of 
illusionary websites, that is, spoof websites that purport to be legitimate through the impersonation, or identity theft, 
of a known corporate brand or government agency. Phishers can be quite sophisticated in their targeting and rely on 
both legitimate and illegitimate means of acquiring the customer details of the real corporate or government agency. 
A review of APWG trends would suggest that target acquisition as an investment made by the phisher to acquire 
details on individuals that are most likely to respond, most notably because they are legitimate customers of the 
impersonated brand, is quite varied [1]. For example, a phisher is not likely to be successful if they were to send an 
email about a corporate that is not well known or does not have a sufficient customer base. The success of the phish 
in large part will be on acquiring the right audience for the intended email. In the words of Frank Gorshin ‘the finer 
the bait, the shorter the wait’ [7]. Emails are then communicated to the intended audience looking to prompt some 
form of response, whether it be a response email, a click of a link embedded in the phishing email, or even, a return 
phone call. The latter was described by the national identity theft support service as a particularly bold measure, and 
one that as our research progressed, provided unique insights into the behavior of the phishers and opportunity for 
future research exploration on the criminal-victim interaction. Given the variety of means phishers sought to acquire 
the targeted personal information and credentials, the simplistic model identified the spectrum as being either 
passive or active in nature. Passive collection relates to situations where the human interaction in the collection 
process on the part of the phisher is minimal or non-existent. Such situations cover events where the arrival at the 
illusionary website by the legitimate customer results in the execution of malware or some other form of virus that 
collects personal data from the computer of the customer without any further interference or communication with the 
phisher. Other more human-centric collection models include the capture of personal information whereby both the 
legitimate customer or victim has to manually add their credentials and personal information via a web-form, or in 
some instances, engages directly with the phisher via telephone or email. Once these details are acquired by the 
phisher, the personal information and credentials are said to have been ‘compromised’, but yet to have been 
‘misused’ [8]. This is an important conceptualization for researchers of identity theft. Phishing events facilitate 
identity compromise, which is a necessary precursor to identity misuse, which may or may not even occur or have 
considerable latent effects. Take for example the theft of credit card information as a common target for phishers. 
Whilst the email may result in the active provision on the part of the customer of their credit card information, such 
information is no use to the phisher unless they do typically one of two response actions: (1) use the credit card 
information to procure goods or services, such as via ‘card not present’ transactions; or (2) on-sell the acquired data 
through carder market places to other criminals that look to use such details for future purchases [9]. Put simply, 
phishing is but one part of a broader identity theft and misuse response. The very same marketplaces that trade in 
compromised credit card information can also facilitate the trading of targeted email addresses and other valuable 
socially engineered data, such as driver license and passport information, credit balances, and bank accounting 
information [9]. 
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Fig. 2. Example of a phishing email using corporate brand.  
 
Figure 2 provides a sample of a phishing email purporting to be sent from Australia’s government owned postal 
service, Australia Post. This email was forward to Australia’s national identity theft support service by a customer 
who had responded to the email, and only after providing copies of their driver license, passport, and credit card 
information, became suspicious that the engagement was a disingenuous. The addressee information has been 
removed. The phishing methodology deployed uses calculative and knowledge-based trust forms as described by 
Koehn [16]. The calculative trust marker relates the cost-benefit decision of the recipient in weighing up the 
financial disincentive of not acting on the prompt for clicking on the “Information about you parcel”. This financial 
disincentive is explicitly referenced within the text “If your order has not been withdrawn within 30 days, our 
Company will charge a storage fee…”. Without clicking on the link, the recipient has no further information about 
the cost, so cleverly, the act of clicking on the link is one that the recipient would use in assisting with their 
calculative trust decision-making. The knowledge-based trust markets evident in the phishing email pertain to the 
brand, Australia Post is the primary provider of domestic and parcel delivery services across Australia. Every postal 
address in Australia would have a pre-existing relationship with Australia Post. The brand is widely known and has 
considerable market penetration. 
3. Work domain analysis to phishing attacks and response 
The research team enlisted the assistance of Australia and New Zealand’s national identity theft support center as 
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in the identification and response across the phishing context. The research 
partnership included access to the national identity theft support center’s Research & Analysis Team that actively 
respond and engage with phishers in understanding new and emerging methods and response requirements, in other 
words, ‘taking the bait’ in order to more readily define the domain. The victim support team were also engaged and 
provided access to case logs from clients (victims of phishing) in exploring the human-computer interactions where 
trust was established and individual participants responded to the phishing attacks. Understanding the victim 
experience enabled the research team to better gauge the communication and knowledge networks in existence 
between phisher, the victim, the legitimate brand owner, and others within the complex system. The Security 
Response Team within the national center provided access to the processes, documentation and activity logs that 
enabled the research team to gain a thorough understanding of how the center and its corporate and government 
partners respond to phishing attacks, and ultimately, the “normal” operating conditions of an online transaction 
environment. The richness of information collected about the functional domain enabled the research team to 
explore the applicability of WDA in describing the phishing attack and the online transaction system. Specifically, 
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through the use of WDA the research team aimed to construct a functional representation of both the phishing attack 
and online transaction environment, and through its overlay, determine individual and shared constraints, 
components and affordances [5]. WDA was selected as a preferred sociotechnical systems method for the research 
study because of its ability to explore purposes and constraints of the environment. The novelty in with this research 
to explore its applicability in an overlay of a system under normal usage conditions, in other words a legitimate 
online transaction environment, with a system under a phishing attack condition. 
In total 524 separate case files were examined from the National Case Management Center from engagements 
they had with victims from 1 October to 31 December 2014. Of these cases, phishing attacks as the initial point of 
compromise were detected for 121 of these matters. Of these cases, the National Case Management Center was able 
to directly or indirectly (in partnership with the legitimate brand) respond to the phishing emails through either (1) 
engaging with the phishing site; (2) communicating with the phisher; or (3) taking appropriate measures to remove 
the phishing website. The multi-dimensional approach to data access and collection enabled the research team to 
obtain a detailed view of the work domain from the perspective of the phisher (the criminal), as well as the 
responders, being the national case management center and their corporate and government partners. The utilization 
of WDA is well proven in contexts involving road safety [17], air traffic control [18], and future technology 
deployment [19]. Each of these contexts offered similar characteristics to the phishing environment, involving 
multiple actors, complex interactions, and an overarching opportunity to explore constraints and opportunities for 
what is possible. Therefore in meeting the study’s aim of exploring the purposes, functions, physical processes and 
objects at different levels of decomposition in providing a deeper understanding of the phishing attack and response 
problem.  
4. Results and analysis 
Utilizing an abstraction hierarchy from documentary analysis of the phishing attack and phishing response 
domains, the research team establish the overall functional purposes as being centrally related to profit generation, 
the secure delivery of services, the building of trust and engagement, and knowledge of the market. Interestingly, all 
of the functional purposes identified are shared by the phishing attack and online transaction environment. For 
example, even when there was engagement occurring directly between the phisher and the national identity center, 
where the phisher believed they were engaging with a potential victim, the sociotechnical system functional purpose 
priority was on the secure delivery of services. The security functional purpose is shared with the online transaction 
system.  
The research team then focused, with the assistance of the SMEs, on the purpose related functions or effects of 
the system. Here the research team had as its central focus the very functions required to achieve the various 
functional purposes of the phishing attack system and the online transaction processing system. Unsurprisingly, like 
the overall functional purposes, the overlapping of functions between the “attack” environment and the normal 
online transaction processing environment were evident. Figure 3 provides an abstraction hierarchy that merges the 
two conditions and their physical objects, object related processes and values and priority measures to the first two 
steps in completing the WDA.   
The abstraction hierarchy is a complex and chaotic result that was tested with the National Response Center’s 
SME teams. Whilst the interrelated and interdependent nature of the abstraction hierarchy is evident, a deeper 
analysis reveals that the successful phishing attack mirrors almost identically the legitimate online transaction 
processing environment. The National Response Center experts believe the more closely an attack resembles a 
legitimate condition, the higher the chance of its success. The bottom level of the abstraction hierarchy in Figure 3 
shows the physical objects that are used to achieve the functions required for online transactions and likewise 
phishing attacks. Notably, seventeen of the nineteen physical objects were shared between the phishing attack 
condition and the legitimate payment processing condition. This paints a clear picture of the difficulties associated 
with preventing and responding to phishing attacks – the very same artefacts that are used to attract and engage 
users in online transactions are used to conduct phishing attacks. This striking finding propagates up through the 
abstraction hierarchy; functions, for example, are key to both activities (e.g. build trust). The evidence of 
virus/malware and the merchant bank were two physical objects that were only singularly represented. The merchant 
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Fig. 3. WDA for Phishing Attacks and Online Transaction Processing System. 
bank is not necessary as a physical object for the phishing attack environment as the payment information and other 
credentials can be profited without a merchant bank (unlike a legitimate online payment system). The same can be 
said of the virus or malware usage in a phishing attack environment – it’s not a physical object requirement under 
legitimate online transaction environments.  
Figure 3 highlights the interdependencies across the multiple levels of abstraction relating to virus and malware 
physical objects. This condition is evident only in phishing attacks, not within legitimate online transaction 
processing events. The permeation throughout the sociotechnical system is abundant. Whilst the object related 
processes or affordances are evident in almost half of the total when overlaid with the legitimate condition, the 
effects, outcomes and end-state or functional purposes escalate in the inter-linkages, making the values and priority 
measures, like the functional purposes, shared between legitimate and attack conditions. This observation creates 
opportunities. Whilst the research has been unable to ascertain whether the associated phishing response 
environment has evolved dramatically since the eighties and nineties, it’s apparent in the WDA that very little values 
are specifically directed to preventing and detecting vulnerabilities, such as warning customers of how phishing 
occurs with specific products, services and brands. A major emphasis within the WDA tends to be on facilitating the 
transaction, and most importantly, engendering the requisite trust in the system to afford participation (whether 
legitimate or fraudulent in nature). This may speak to the natural tension confronting business between the need to 
encourage participation online, versus the need to share knowledge about online risks. The findings may also lend 
support to the view that legitimate corporate transaction environments may best respond to phishing attack 
conditions where it innovates and creates alternative payment process opportunities, focuses on virus and malware 
protection, and importantly, educates consumers about the unique things it requires that can only be legitimized by 
the legitimate corporate with their customer.  
5. Conclusions 
Phishing attacks are complex phenomena that occur within complex sociotechnical systems. Their nature, and the 
nature of the systems in which they occur, demands that a systems approach be taken when attempting to understand 
and prevent them. This research provided a snapshot of the first of many steps being taken by the co-authors in 
exploring the opportunities the application of human factors and sociotechnical systems methods can create in 
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observing the cybercrime environment. The utilization of WDA in overlapping legitimate and criminal conditions 
within the online transaction system shows promise. The research found considerable overlap across many levels of 
abstraction. Whilst the focus of the analysis were on the conditions that showed little apparent overlap, the reverse 
opportunities for analysis equally present. In other words, developing a resilience to phishing attacks could equally 
draw its attention on the part of the abstraction where there are considerable overlap. This, like the latent effects of 
legitimate online transaction system innovation on the phishing objects, processes and functions, create new 
opportunities for future research to test the boundaries and application of human factors and sociotechnical systems 
methods. Future research to be undertaken as part of this wider program of research involves applying the remaining 
four phases of CWA to further understand this complex issue and to develop and analytically prototype 
countermeasures and response strategies.The phishing attack and response environment is a complex system. One 
that has had little systems focus to date, and one that provides considerable opportunities in better understanding 
how and why individuals “take the bait”, and how and why corporates can alter the feeding patterns of the phish 
they seek to catch out.  
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